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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Johnson appeals from the trial court's (1) grant of Wilsons' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; and (2) grant of Wilsons' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly conclude that as a result of Johnson's
signature to Addendum No. 3, her acceptance of Addendum No. 3, and her transmission
of that acceptance to Wilsons, Johnson agreed to the terms of the Real Estate Purchase
Agreement and all addenda and counteroffers, including the Seller Financing Addendum,
that were not modified by the terms of Addendum No. 3?
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness." Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2, ^6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted).
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court properly hold that Wilsons fully performed their
obligations pursuant to their agreement with Johnson?
Standard of Review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions
and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness." Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2,1J6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation omitted).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
To the extent necessary for this Court to fully review Johnson's claims, Utah Code
sections 25-5-1 and 25-5-3 may be implicated. These sections are set forth in Johnson's
Addendum A and Addendum B.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson ("Wilsons") commenced this action against

Angela Johnson ("Johnson") on March 19, 2007. Among other things, Wilsons asked the
trial court to declare that the purchase agreement between Wilsons and Johnson was valid
and enforceable and to grant Wilsons an award of damages as a result of Johnson's
failure to fully perform under that agreement. On May 18, 2007, Johnson counterclaimed
against Wilsons asking for a judgment declaring the purchase agreement to be
unenforceable, or, in the alternative, asserting a breach of contract claim against Wilsons.
On June 27, 2007 Wilsons filed a motion for partial summary judgment with
respect to the validity of the purchase agreement, specifically on the issue of whether
Johnson was bound by the terms of a certain seller-financing addendum. In response,
Johnson filed her own motion for partial summary judgment on both her declaratory
judgment and breach of contract causes of action. In finding for Wilsons, the trial court
held that Johnson was bound by the terms of the seller-financing addendum and that
Wilsons were not in breach of the agreement. Thereafter Wilsons filed a motion for
summary judgment on their breach of contract claim, which the trial court granted.
Johnson now appeals both the trial court's final order granting summary judgment and its
interim order granting partial summary judgment.
IL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Johhnson is the owner of property located at 704 South Anasazi Circle,
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Washington, Utah - the property at issue in this case ("Residence"). (R. 584.) Johnson
listed the Residence for sale on or about December 1, 2006, advertising the fact that she
was willing to seller-finance the transaction at 4.9% per annum. (R. 584.) On or about
January 6, 2007 Wilsons offered to purchase the Residence from Johnson, offering to pay
$1,100,000 with Wilsons paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a
total of $110,000 down and Johnson seller-financing $990,000. (R. 584.) Wilsons' offer
was made on a standard Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") form approved by the
State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. (R. 584.) The initial offer specified that the
purchase price would be paid through seller financing and contained the following
language:
There [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing
additional terms. If there are, the terms of the following
addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference.
[ ] Addendum No. 1 [X] Seller Financing Addendum [ ]
FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ]
Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some
transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] LeadBased Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum
is required by law) [X] Other (specify) Notice of Interest
Addendum.
(R. 584.)
Along with the initial offer, and to specify the terms of the seller financing,
Wilsons included a seller financing addendum ("Seller Financing Addendum") that
specified that Johnson would provide seller financing for the Residence in the principal
amount of $990,000 at 4.9% per annum for 360 months, with the first payment to begin
May 1, 2007. (R. 584.) On or about January 8, 2007, Johnson executed a counteroffer,
listed as Addendum No. 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000 for the purchase of the
STG_285424.1
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Residence and "requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house on the market."
(R. 585.) Addendum No. 2 specifically states:
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or
conflict with any provision of the REPC, including all prior
addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All
other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and
counteroffers, not modified by this ADDENDUM shall
remain the same.
(R. 585.) Defendant's counteroffer made no mention of the Seller Financing Addendum
and made no changes to any terms of the original offer, other than those noted above. (R.
585.)
On that same date, Wilsons executed Addendum No. 3, counter-offering the
following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (b) in lieu of 72 hour clause, settlement to
be 2-23-07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released to seller on
2-10-07; and (d) all other terms and conditions to remain the same. (R. 585.) On the
same date, Johnson signed both the REPC and Addendum No. 3, but did not sign the
Seller Financing Addendum. (R. 585.) In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from
Wilsons' initial offer to the final agreement, the parties did not change the language of
the REPC or the Seller Financing Addendum, which stated that Johnson would finance
$990,000 as the seller and that Wilsons would pay a total of $110,000 as a down
payment. (R. 585.)
The parties agreed to close on the sale of the Residence by February 23, 2007. (R.
585.) On or about February 10, 2007, Johnson received the $20,000 earnest money
deposit check and negotiated it. (R. 586.) Wilsons closed their end of the transaction on
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February 23, 2007 by signing, among other documents, an All-Inclusive Trust Deed in
the amount of $1,035,000.00 and bringing $98,625.42 to the closing officer. (R. 586.)
At closing on February 23, 2007, Johnson did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement
because she did not agree with the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum. (R. 586.)
The transaction did not close on February 23, 2007. (R. 586.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly concluded that as a result of Johnson's signature to
Addendum No. 3, her acceptance of Addendum No. 3, and her transmission of her
acceptance to Wilsons, Johnson agreed to the terms of the REPC and all addenda and
counteroffers that were not changed by the terms of Addendum No. 3, including the
terms of the Seller Financing Addendum. Johnson was not required to sign the Seller
Financing Addendum in order to be bound by its terms because the Seller Financing
Addendum was specifically incorporated and made part of the REPC, which she signed,
and because Addendum No. 3, which she also signed, clearly stated that all other terms of
the REPC, addenda, and counteroffers that were not modified by the addendum would
remain the same.
In addition, the District Court also correctly concluded that Wilsons fully
performed in accordance with the contract documents. Specifically, Wilsons' conduct
with respect to the funding and documents provided at closing was entirely consistent
with the intentions of Wilsons and Johnson with respect to the amount to be financed by
each party. When Johnson demanded a higher purchase price, the amount each party
would finance increased proportionately, which increase was reflected in the funds and

STG_285424 1
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documents provided by Wilsons. Thus, Wilsons fully performed under the agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT JOHNSON WAS
BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THE SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.
Johnson claims that because she never signed the Seller Financing Addendum, she

was never bound by its terms. Contrary to Johnson's arguments, however, the Seller
Financing Addendum did not need to be signed to become binding because both the
REPC and Addendum No. 3, which she did sign, incorporated the Seller Financing
Addendum into their terms. Thus, in signing the REPC and Addendum No. 3, Johnson
(1) accepted the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum as required, (2) fulfilled any
signature requirements under the Statute of Frauds, and (3) bound herself to the seller
financing terms. In addition, Wilsons' conduct with respect to the agreement was
entirely in line with the terms and intent of the Seller Financing Addendum and thus
demonstrated that they understood that the parties had agreed to the Seller Financing
Addendum.

Johnson asserts that Wilsons knew that the Seller Financing Addendum was not
binding because they conveyed a second seller financing addendum to her. The second
addendum, however, was only drawn up upon Johnson's agent asking for a new
document that specified the amounts of principle, tax, and insurance in escrow. (R. 338,
350). The new seller financing addendum had essentially the same terms as the first, but
broken down as requested. (R. 350.) At no time did Johnson or her agent give any
indication that she had not agreed to the terms of the original Seller Financing
Addendum. (R. 350.) In sum, Wilsons did not deliver the second seller financing
addendum to Johnson under the assumption that they had not agreed, but to provide her
with further supplemental information that she had requested. In addition, as further
explained below, Wilsons' conduct with respect to the funds and documents delivered at
closing was entirely consistent with the intent and terms of the Seller Financing
Addendum.

STG 285424.1
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A.

Johnson Accepted the Terms of the Seller Financing Addendum as
Required,

Johnson first argues that the Seller Financing Addendum was not binding because
she did not accept it as required by its express terms. Johnson, however, did not need to
"accept" the Seller Financing Addendum for the seller financing terms to become
binding. Since the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum were specifically
incorporated into the REPC, Johnson never had to accept the Seller Financing Addendum
at all. Merely signing the REPC accepted the seller financing terms. To the extent that it
is relevant, however, Johnson points out that the Seller Financing Addendum stated that it
had to be accepted "in accordance with Section 23 of the REPC," which required Johnson
to (1) sign the offer or counteroffer where noted and (2) communicate her acceptance to
the other party. By signing the REPC, Addendum No. 2, and Addendum No. 3, and
communicating her acceptance of all the terms included in the REPC and any
accompanying addenda that were not modified by subsequent counteroffers, Johnson
clearly accepted the Seller Financing Addendum as required.
In general, a written contract may consist of several writings. See Sacramento
Baseball Club v. Great N. Baseball Co.. 748 P.2d. 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987) ("An
agreement may be a single contract even though it consists of several writings that the
parties have never physically attached to each other."). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that a "contract may be contained in several instruments, which, if made at the
same time, between the same parties, and in relation to the same subject, will be held to
constitute one contract." Sharp v. Clark, 45 P. 566, 568 (Utah 1896); see also Kansas
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Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.. 740 F.2d 780, 790 (10th Cir. 1984)
(stating that a contract "may consist of several writings if one of the writings is signed
and the writings in the circumstances clearly indicate that they relate to the same
transaction") (citation omitted). In addition, a contract "may consist of several separate
documents, even though not all of them are signed." Kansas Power & Light Co., 740
F.2d at 790 (holding that the statute of frauds had been satisfied) (citation omitted).
Indeed, as American Jurisprudence explains:
A memorandum may consist of a writing signed by the party
to be charged and another writing or writings referred to in
the signed writing expressly or, according to the prevailing
opinion, impliedly, by reason of the connection between the
papers in the subject matter, notwithstanding that the other
writing or writings are not signed by him.
72 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds §286 (emphasis added). In other words, though a
contract consists of multiple pages, not every page needs be signed to be included in the
ultimate agreement. So long as there is no substantial inconsistency between a signed
document and a document that is incorporated by reference or relied upon to establish the
material terms of the contract, the incorporated document, even if not signed, should be
included as part of the agreement. See kL
In the instant case, the REPC and the Seller Financing Addendum are clearly one
contract. First, the REPC specifically references any attached Seller Financing Addenda
and states in Section 9 that "the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this
Contract by this reference," after which the box for Seller Financing Addendum is clearly
marked. Second, in specifically looking at the Seller Financing Addendum, it is clear

STG 285424 1
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that the terms of that writing are entirely dependent upon the terms of the REPC. Indeed,
the Seller Financing Addendum simply explains the terms of the seller financing, as
specified in the REPC itself. Third, the Seller Financing Addendum specifically states
that it was made part of the REPC and that the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum
were incorporated as part of the REPC. Fourth, when Johnson accepted the REPC by
signing it and offering her counteroffer ("Addendum No. 2") before the acceptance
deadline, she specifically stated that "[a]ll other terms of the REPC, including all prior
addenda and counteroffers, not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same."
Thus, in signing that counteroffer, and communicating it to Wilsons by the deadline,
Johnson accepted all of the terms included in the REPC and the Seller Financing
Addendum, as required by Section 23, with the exception of those terms modified by the
counteroffer. When both parties signed Addendum No. 3, the agreement became final,
which agreement incorporated, pursuant to the language of Addendum No. 3, all terms in
the REPC and all prior addenda that had not been changed. In short, the Seller Financing
Addendum did not need to be signed; the counteroffers simply needed to be signed, and
they were. As a result, based upon a review of the documents, the Seller Financing
Addendum was clearly part of the REPC and Johnson was bound by it.
B.

The Seller Financing Addendum Is Not a Separate Agreement Nor a
Modification to the Original Agreement and Therefore, Does Not Need
to Be Separately Signed.

Johnson next argues that enforcement of the Seller Financing Addendum would
violate the Statute of Frauds. Johnson's argument only works, however, if the Seller
Financing Addendum is considered a separate agreement, requiring separate

STG_285424 1
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consideration, or a modification of the original agreement. As argued above, however,
neither is applicable in this case. First, the Seller Financing Addendum cannot stand
alone, but is totally dependent upon and serves only as an explanation of the terms of the
REPC, which clearly states that the deal would be seller financed. Second, the Seller
Financing Addendum is not a modification of the original agreement as none of the terms
in the Seller Financing Addendum in any way contradict or change the terms of the
REPC. Indeed, although Johnson argues that each addendum to the REPC, including the
Seller Financing Addendum, represented a subsequent modification of the REPC, the
Seller Financing Addendum was actually the only addendum that did not change any of
the terms of the REPC, and thus clearly was not a modification. In addition, the
counteroffers extended never stated anything concerning the Seller Financing Addendum,
but clearly stated that, unless the terms of the counteroffers stated otherwise, the terms of
all previous offers, including addenda, remained the same. By signing these
counteroffers, specifically Addendum No. 3, Johnson clearly accepted the terms of all
previous offers, including the Seller Financing Addendum, that did not contradict the
terms of the counteroffers.
Johnson argues that, unless all addenda are signed, the parties would be "uncertain
as to which addenda were binding and which were not." This is simply not the case. The
documents clearly state that prior addenda, unless modified, remain part of the deal. The
documents were dated, and therefore, it is easy to determine which portions of the
agreement were unchanged by counteroffers and incorporated by reference and which
were not. The law does not require that all of the pages of an agreement be signed, but

STG 285424 1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

simply that the writings expressly or implicitly reference one another. See 72 AM. JUR.
2D, Statute of Frauds §286. In other words, Johnson did not need to sign every page of
the REPC and Seller Financing Addendum; her signature on the REPC and subsequent
counteroffers was sufficient to bind her to all of the contract's terms, including the Seller
Financing Addendum that was incorporated by reference.
Johnson uses the case of Williams v. Singleton in an attempt to show that her
failure to sign the Seller Financing Addendum would "play havoc" with the laws of offer
and acceptance. See 723 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986). It is difficult to see how this case
applies. In Williams, the issue involved whether a joint tenant selling property could
accept an offer after the offer had lapsed. See id. In this case, Johnson has never argued
that there was no agreement, but simply that she had not agreed to the seller financing
terms. To follow this argument, one must believe that the REPC and the Seller Financing
Addendum were two separate independent agreements within one large agreement. Such
a conclusion leads to absurd results and fails to follow standard real estate purchase
practices in Utah.
In short, there is no dispute that the REPC incorporated the Seller Financing
Addendum by reference and that Johnson's signature on the REPC and Addendum No. 3
manifested her assent to the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum. Thus, the District
Court was correct in finding that the Seller Financing Addendum was binding on
Johnson.

STG 285424 1
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT WILSONS
WERE NOT IN BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT.
Johnson argues that Wilsons breached the contract by executing a promissory note

and trust deed in an amount higher than the amount specified in the REPC and the Seller
Financing Addendum. Since Johnson demanded a higher purchase price in her
counteroffer, however, it is only sensible to assume that the intent would be for the
amount of the promissory note and trust deed to increase as well. Indeed, a review of the
REPC shows that Wilsons and Johnson had agreed that Wilsons would pay 10% down
and that Johnson would finance the rest. It is undisputed that (1) the parties intended that
the transaction would be seller-financed; (2) the original offer included a down payment
equal to 10% of the purchase price with 90% to be seller-financed; and (3) the ultimate
purchase price of $1,150,000 was $50,000 higher than the original offer of $1,100,000,
which had to be paid by someone. When viewing these facts in harmony with one
another, the District Court was correct in concluding that when the parties agreed to
change the ultimate purchase price by executing Addendum No. 3, they also agreed to
change the amounts each party would bring to the table. To hold otherwise would lead to
an unreasonable result.
A.

The Parties Clearly Intended to Proportionately Increase Wilsons9
Down Payment and the Amount Johnson Would Seller Finance Based
upon the Increase in Price.

With respect to this issue, some rules of contract interpretation are instructive.
First,
[W]hen a literal interpretation of the language [of a contract]
would result in an unreasonable and absurd result, and in
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injustice, the court will consider the entire contract in the light
of the circumstances under which it was made, and in the
view of the interests and motives which ordinarily control
human actions, and give to its language a reasonable
construction.
Johnson v. Schenk, 50 P. 921, 923 (Utah 1897). Second, the court determines this result
from the documents' own four corners, unless determined to be ambiguous. See
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 2002 UT 62,1J16, 52 P.3d 1179. Third, these
terms may be enforced "even though some contract terms may be missing or left to be
agreed upon." Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm, 2003 UT 37, ^|12, 78 P.3d 600. In addition, Utah
courts have the authority to fill any such gaps. See Evans v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
2005 UT 74,1J16, 123 P.3d 432. That is, where the parties have clearly intended to be
bound by an agreement, the court should not frustrate that purpose if it is possible to
come up with a fair and just result, "even though this requires a choice among conflicting
meanings and the filling of some gaps that the parties have left." Id. (citing CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS, §4.1). Fourth, when interpreting a contract, if one interpretation renders an
agreement invalid, where the other renders it valid, the Court should adopt the latter. See
Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998). Finally, where an
agreement contains an objective method or formula for determining a price, the Court
may use that method or formula from the document and enforce the agreement based
upon plugging in those numbers. See Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. Le Chase Constr. Servs.,
LLC, 31 A.D. 3d 983, 986 (N.Y.S. 2006); Weiner v. Hazen 430 N.W. 2d 269, 271 (Neb.
1988) (inferring that, where there is a formula that would determine price to "a
reasonable certainty," the contract would be enforceable).
STG__285424.1
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In this matter, the Court is faced with two specific interpretations of the parties'
agreement. Under Wilsons' explanation, when the ultimate price increased by $50,000,
the amounts each party would bring to the table increased in proportion to the amounts
specified in the original offer, which proportions were 10% by Wilsons, 90% by Johnson.
Such an interpretation, which takes into account the language of the contract documents,
simply makes sense. Johnson, on the other hand, interprets the language of the
documents to read that she was obligated to finance only $990,000 because that is the
amount the REPC says she would finance. She claims that Wilsons were required to
bring the additional $50,000 to closing, and because they did not, they breached the
contract first, excusing Johnson from performing.
This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the REPC also states that
Wilsons were only required to pay $1,100,000. Under this logic, Wilsons have a
compelling argument that Johnson was required to finance the entire additional $50,000,
particularly where the additional price was for her benefit. It is also conceivable under
this logic that no one would pay the additional $50,000, leaving a gaping hole. Such an
interpretation simply does not make sense. It leaves the parties with essentially no
agreement, which clearly was not their intent.
Johnson attempts to bolster her argument by referencing Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d
1374 (Utah 1980). In Reed, the Utah Supreme Court found that where payment of
$70,000 was to be upon "terms to be arranged," the buyer was obligated to tender full
payment. IcL at 1378-79. In citing this case, however, Johnson ignores the fact that
unlike Reed, in the instant case there were specific terms of payment specified in the
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agreement. Indeed, the parties intended to proportionately increase Wilsons' down
payment and the amount Johnson would seller finance based upon the increase in price.
By paying the funds and presenting the documents required according to the proportions
set forth in the REPC, Wilsons clearly acted in accordance with the agreement. Thus,
this Court should uphold the District Court's conclusion that Wilsons did not breach the
REPC and Seller Financing Addendum.
III.

WILSONS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED ON
APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wilsons

hereby request an award of all attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with this
appeal. In general, additional attorney's fees will be allowed for successful defense
against an appeal where the prevailing party below was awarded attorney fees based upon
a contractual stipulation. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, T[27, 40 P.3d 1119.
In the instant case, the REPC specifically allows for the prevailing party to receive an
award of attorney fees (R. 604). Thus, the District Court awarded Wilsons attorney fees
and costs based upon that contract (R. 605). Therefore, by prevailing on appeal, Wilsons
should be awarded the attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal based upon that
contractual stipulation.

In fact, it is noteworthy that the record is devoid of any evidence that Johnson
was concerned about the amount Wilsons provided as a down payment at closing at that
time, but rather shows that she was only concerned about the terms of the seller financing
addendum.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Wilsons respectfully request that this Court affirm the
trial court's order granting partial summary judgment, its final order and judgment, and
its amended order entered on March 6, 2009; award attorney fees incurred on appeal; and
provide such additional and further relief as it deems appropriate.

DATED this
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day of November, 2009.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

Michael F. Leavitt
Melinda L.Hill
Attorneys for Appellees/Plaintiffs
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^
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